The Shapley value for directed graph games by Khmelnitskaya, Anna et al.
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
The Shapley value for directed graph games
Anna Khmelnitskaya∗ O¨zer Selc¸uk† Dolf Talman‡
December 8, 2015
Abstract
The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) TU games with limited cooperation in-
duced by a digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players is introduced.
It is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all
permutations which do not violate the induced subordination of players. We study
properties of this solution and its core stability. For digraph games with the digraphs
being directed cycles an axiomatization of the solution is obtained.
Keywords: TU game; Shapley value; directed graph; dominance structure; core; con-
vexity
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1 Introduction
In classical cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players may form and
is able to obtain payoffs for its members. Problem is how much payoff each player should
receive. However, in many practical situations the set of feasible coalitions is limited by some
social, economical, hierarchical, or technical structure. One of the most famous singleton
solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games), where payoffs can be
distributed freely among the players, is the Shapley value [9] defined as the average of the
marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations on the players. Several
adaptations of the Shapley value for models of games with limited cooperation among the
players are well known in the literature, cf. Aumann and Dre`ze [1] and Owen [8] for games
with coalition structure, Myerson [7] for games with cooperation structure introduced by
means of undirected graphs in which only the connected players are able to cooperate. For
games with limited cooperation that is described in terms of (cycle-free) directed graphs
(digraphs) we mention Gilles and Owen [4] for games with permission structure using the
disjunctive approach and Gilles at al. [5] for such games using the conjunctive approach,
and Faigle and Kern [2] for games with precedence constraints.
In this paper we assume that restricted cooperation is determined by an arbitrary di-
graph on the player set, the directed links of which prescribe the subordination among the
players. For example, consider a society consisting of individuals with different opinions,
possibly incomplete preferences, about the importance of several proposals or tasks that
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need to be completed. If the preferences of the individuals are aggregated by using major-
ity voting, then it is well known that the resulting structure will be a directed graph on
the set of alternatives. In this directed graph, a directed link from one proposal to another
proposal means that the majority of the society thinks that the former one is more impor-
tant than the latter one. If it is assumed that at each moment only one proposal or task
can be performed, then when one is completed, the next one to be performed can be any of
its immediate successors in the digraph or one of those the performance of which does not
depend on it. In this example the digraph might not be cycle-free because directed cycles
may stand for the well known Condorcet paradox.
On the class of digraph games, which are games with restricted cooperation determined
by a digraph prescribing the dominance relation on the set of players, we introduce the
so-called Shapley value for digraph games as the average of marginal contribution vectors
corresponding to all permutations not violating the subordination of players. Contrary to
the Myerson model, the feasible coalitions are not necessarily connected. We show that
the Shapley value for digraph games meets efficiency, linearity, the restricted null player
property, the restricted equal treatment property, is independent of inessential links, and is
stable with respect to the appropriate core concept under a convexity type condition which
is weaker than the usual convexity guaranteeing the core stability of the classical Shapley
value. On the subclass of cycle digraph games for which the digraphs are directed cycles
an axiomatization is provided.
Since precedence constraints are determined by a partial ordering on the player set which
can be represented by a cycle-free digraph, the games under precedence constraints form a
subclass of cycle-free digraph games on which the Shapley value for digraph games coincides
with the Shapley value for games under precedence constraints of Faigle and Kern [2]. There
is no straightforward relation of permission values for games with permission structure
with the newly introduced Shapley value for digraph games. In games with permission
structure players need permission from their predecessors in order to cooperate, at least
one of them for disjunctive approach and all of them for conjunctive approach. In both
cases a permission-restricted TU game is derived from the given TU game taking into
account the permission structure and the disjunctive and conjunctive permission values
for games with permission structure are defined as the Shapley value of the corresponding
permission-restricted games.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. Section 3
introduces the Shapley value for digraph games and discusses its properties and stability.
An axiomatization on the subclass of cycle digraph games is obtained in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N, v), whereN = {1, . . . , n}
is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function with v(∅) = 0,
assigning to any coalition S ⊆ N its worth v(S). The set of TU games with fixed player
set N is denoted GN . For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears we write v
when we refer to a game (N, v). It is well known (cf. Shapley [9]) that unanimity games
{uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
, defined as uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise, form a basis in GN . A
value on G ⊆ GN is a function ξ : G → IR
N that assigns to every v ∈ G a vector ξ(v) ∈ IRN
where ξi(v) is the payoff to i ∈ N in v. The marginal contribution of i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i}
in v ∈ GN is given by m
v
i (S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). In the sequel we use standard notation
2
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x(S)=
∑
i∈S
xi for any x∈ IR
N and S ⊆ N .
For a permutation pi : N → N , pi(i) is the position of player i ∈ N in pi, Ppi(i) = {j ∈
N | pi(j) < pi(i)} is the set of predecessors of i in pi, and P¯pi(i) = Ppi(i) ∪ {i}. In what
follows we identify a permutation pi with the vector (pi(1), . . . , pi(n)). Let Π be the set of
permutations on N . For v ∈ GN and pi ∈ Π the marginal contribution vector m¯
v(pi)∈ IRN is
given by m¯vi (pi)=m
v
i (Ppi(i))=v(P¯pi(i))−v(Ppi(i)) for all i∈N . The Shapley value of v∈G
N
is given by Sh(v)=
∑
pi∈Π
m¯v(pi)/n!.
A graph on N consists of N as the set of nodes and for a directed graph (digraph) a
collection of ordered pairs Γ ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} as the set of directed links (arcs)
from one player to another in N , and for an undirected graph a collection of unordered
pairs Γ ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} as the set of links (edges) between two players in N .
Observe that an undirected graph can be considered as a digraph for which (i, j) ∈ Γ iff
(j, i) ∈ Γ. We say that a digraph Γ contains an undirected link {i, j} and write {i, j} ∈ Γ
if (i, j), (j, i) ∈ Γ. The set of digraphs on fixed N we denote ΓN . For Γ ∈ ΓN and S ⊆ N ,
Γ|S = {(i, j) ∈Γ | i, j∈ S} is the subgraph of Γ on S. Given Γ ∈ ΓN a sequence of different
players (i1, . . . , ir), r ≥ 2, is a path in Γ between i1 and ir if {(ih, ih+1), (ih+1, ih)} ∩ Γ 6= ∅
for h=1, . . . , r−1, and a directed path in Γ from i1 to ir if (ih, ih+1) ∈ Γ for h=1, . . . , r−1.
A directed path (i1, . . . , ir) is a directed cycle if (ir, i1) ∈ Γ and when r ≥ 3, both the path
does not contain undirected links and (i1, ir) /∈ Γ. Γ is cycle-free if it contains no directed
cycles. Players i, j ∈ N are connected in Γ if there exists a path in Γ between i and j.
Γ is connected if any i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, are connected in Γ. S ⊆ N is connected in Γ if
Γ|S is connected. For S ⊆ N , C
Γ(S) denotes the collection of subsets of S connected in
Γ, S/Γ is the collection of maximal connected subsets, called components, of S in Γ. For
i, j ∈ N if there exists a directed path in Γ from i to j, then j is a successor of i and i
is a predecessor of j in Γ. If (i, j) ∈ Γ, then j is an immediate successor of i and i is an
immediate predecessor of j in Γ. For i ∈ N , SΓ(i) denotes the set of successors of i in Γ
and S¯Γ(i) = SΓ(i) ∪ {i}. A chain on N is a connected cycle-free digraph on N in which
each player has at most one immediate successor and one immediate predecessor.
For Γ ∈ ΓN , S ⊆ N and i, j ∈ S, i dominates j in Γ|S , denoted i ≻Γ|S j, if j ∈ S
Γ|S(i)
and i /∈ SΓ|S(j). Observe that the dominance relation between two players may differ
between different coalitions they both belong to. Player i ∈ S is undominated in Γ|S if no
player in S dominates i in Γ|S , i.e., i ∈ S
Γ|S(j) implies j ∈ SΓ|S (i). Note that a player
undominated in Γ|S either has no predecessor in Γ|S or lies on a directed cycle in Γ|S . U
Γ(S)
denotes the set of players undominated in Γ|S . Since N is finite, U
Γ(S) 6= ∅ for ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
A pair (v,Γ) of v ∈ GN and Γ ∈ ΓN constitutes a directed graph game, or a digraph
game. The set of digraph games on fixed N is denoted GΓN . A value on G⊆G
Γ
N is a function
ξ:G→ IRN assigning to every (v,Γ)∈G a payoff vector ξ(v,Γ).
3 The Shapley value for digraph games
In a digraph game the digraph prescribes a dominance relation between the players that
puts restrictions on the feasibility of coalitions. Assuming that in order to cooperate players
may join only the players not dominating them, the set of feasible coalitions of a digraph
game consists of hierarchical coalitions.
Given Γ ∈ ΓN , S ⊆ N is a hierarchical coalition in Γ if i ∈ S, (i, j) ∈ Γ, and i /∈ S
Γ(j)
imply S¯Γ(j) ⊂ S.
3
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If a player in a hierarchical coalition dominates an immediate successor, then the coali-
tion also contains this latter player and all his successors. Every hierarchical coalition
preserves the subordination of players and therefore is feasible. For a cycle-free Γ ∈ ΓN ,
S ⊆ N is hierarchical iff every successor of any i ∈ S in Γ belongs to S, i.e., S¯Γ(i) ⊆ S for
all i ∈ S. So, for a cycle-free digraph the set of hierarchical coalitions coincides with the
set of feasible coalitions in Faigle and Kern [2] when the precedence constraints are induced
by the same digraph. Note that both the empty and grand coalitions are hierarchical. A
hierarchical coalition is not necessarily connected. In an undirected graph, in particular
in the empty graph, every coalition is hierarchical. For Γ ∈ ΓN , H(Γ) denotes the set of
coalitions hierarchical in Γ and Hc(Γ) its subset of all connected coalitions. Observe that
S, T ∈ H(Γ) implies S ∪ T, S ∩ T ∈ H(Γ).
Given Γ ∈ ΓN , pi ∈ Π is consistent with Γ if it preserves the subordination of players
determined by Γ, i.e., pi(j) < pi(i) only if j ⊁Γ|
P¯pi(i)
i.
For Γ ∈ ΓN , Π
Γ denotes the set of permutations consistent with Γ. Since N is finite,
ΠΓ 6=∅.
Remark 3.1 For every pi ∈ ΠΓ each player is undominated in the subgraph of Γ on the set
composed by this player and his predecessors in pi, i.e., i ∈ UΓ(P¯pi(i)) for all i ∈ N .
The next proposition shows that every consistent permutation generates a sequence of
feasible coalitions consisting of a player and his predecessors in the permutation.
Proposition 3.1 Given Γ ∈ ΓN , if pi∈Π
Γ, then P¯pi(i), Ppi(i)∈H(Γ) for all i∈N .
Proof. First note that (i) N ∈ H(Γ), (ii) N = P¯pi(h) for some h ∈ N , and (iii) for
each i ∈ N it holds that Ppi(i) = P¯pi(j) for j ∈ Ppi(i) such that pi(j) = max
k∈Ppi(i)
pi(k). So,
it suffices to show that if P¯pi(k) ∈ H(Γ) for some k ∈ N , then Ppi(k) ∈ H(Γ) as well. If
P¯pi(k) ∈ H(Γ), then i ∈ Ppi(k), (i, j) ∈ Γ, and i /∈ S
Γ(j) imply S¯Γ(j) ⊂ P¯pi(k). To prove that
Ppi(k) ∈ H(Γ) we show k /∈ S¯
Γ(j). Suppose k ∈ S¯Γ(j). Then (i, j) ∈ Γ implies k ∈ SΓ(i);
i ∈ Ppi(j) and S¯
Γ(j) ⊂ P¯pi(k) imply k ∈ S
Γ|
P¯pi(k)(i); P¯pi(k) ∈ H(Γ) implies k ∈ U
Γ(P¯pi(k)).
Hence, i ∈ SΓ|P¯pi(k)(k), and therefore, i ∈ SΓ(k). Then k ∈ S¯Γ(j) implies i ∈ SΓ(j), which
contradicts i /∈ SΓ(j).
Remark 3.2 If Γ ∈ ΓN is a directed cycle, then for all pi ∈Π
Γ and i∈N both P¯pi(i) and
Ppi(i) are connected in Γ. Moreover, U
Γ(N) = N and UΓ(P¯pi(i)) = {i} if P¯pi(i) 6= N .
We define the Shapley value for digraph games as the average of the marginal contribu-
tion vectors corresponding to all consistent permutations, i.e., for any (v,Γ)∈GΓN ,
Sh(v,Γ) =
1
|ΠΓ|
∑
pi∈ΠΓ
m¯v(pi). (1)
Example 3.1 Consider the 5-player digraph games (v,Γ), (v,Γ′), and (v,Γ′′) with charac-
teristic function v(S) = |S|2 for all S ⊆ N and digraphs as depicted in Figure 1.
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a) digraph Γ b) digraph Γ′ c) digraph Γ′′
Figure 1
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There are 20 permutations consistent with Γ: pi1 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1), pi2 = (5, 3, 4, 2, 1), pi3 =
(5, 4, 2, 3, 1), pi4 = (5, 2, 4, 3, 1), pi5 = (2, 5, 4, 3, 1), pi6 = (5, 3, 2, 4, 1), pi7 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1), pi8 =
(2, 5, 3, 4, 1), pi9=(5, 2, 4, 1, 3), pi10=(2, 5, 4, 1, 3), pi11=(5, 4, 2, 1, 3), pi12=(5, 2, 1, 4, 3), pi13=
(2, 5, 1, 4, 3), pi14 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), pi15 = (5, 2, 3, 1, 4), pi16 = (2, 5, 3, 1, 4), pi17 = (5, 3, 2, 1, 4),
pi18=(5, 2, 1, 3, 4), pi19=(2, 5, 1, 3, 4), pi20=(2, 1, 5, 3, 4), and Sh(v,Γ)= (7, 3, 13/2, 13/2, 2).
There are 5 permutations consistent with Γ′ : pi1 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1), pi2 = (4, 3, 2, 1, 5), pi3 =
(3, 2, 1, 5, 4), pi4 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), pi5 = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2), and Sh(v,Γ′) = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5). There are
10 permutations consistent with Γ′′ : pi1=(5, 4, 3, 2, 1), pi2=(5, 1, 4, 3, 2), pi3=(5, 3, 2, 1, 4),
pi4 = (5, 2, 1, 4, 3), pi5 = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2), pi6 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), pi7 = (2, 5, 1, 4, 3), pi8 = (3, 2, 1, 5, 4),
pi9 = (3, 5, 2, 1, 4), pi10 = (3, 2, 5, 1, 4), and Sh(v,Γ′′) = (5, 2, 4.6, 5.2, 7, 3). To compare, the
Shapley value of v is the average of 120 marginal contribution vectors determined by all
pi ∈ Π and Sh(v)=(5, 5, 5, 5, 5). Due to the symmetry of both v and Γ′, Sh(v,Γ′)=Sh(v).
When Γ ∈ ΓN represents an undirected graph, i.e., there is no subordination between
the players in Γ, the Shapley value of (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN coincides with the Shapley value of v.
Both values also coincide if v is symmetric and Γ is a directed cycle, as for (v,Γ′) in Example
3.1. In general, the Shapley value of a digraph game does not coincide with the Myerson
value [7] of the corresponding undirected graph game because the Myerson value is defined
as the average of all marginal contribution vectors of the Myerson restricted game. Since
a cycle-free digraph on the player set provides a partial ordering of the players and for a
cycle-free digraph the set of hierarchical coalitions coincides with the set of feasible coalitions
in Faigle and Kern [2], on the subclass of cycle-free digraph games the Shapley value for
digraph games coincides with the Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence
constraints defined in Faigle and Kern [2]. Moreover, if for a connected digraph game all
covering trees of the digraph are chains, the Shapley value for digraph games coincides with
the average covering tree value introduced in Khmelnitskaya, Selcuk, and Talman [6]. In
particular, this holds for cycle digraph games for which the digraph is a directed cycle.
A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is efficient (E ) if for any (v,Γ) ∈ G,
∑
i∈N ξi(v,Γ) = v(N).
A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is linear (L) if for any (v,Γ), (w,Γ) ∈ G and a, b ∈ IR, ξ(av +
bw,Γ) = aξ(v,Γ) + bξ(w,Γ), where (av+bw)(S)=av(S)+bw(S) for all S ⊆ N .
A value ξ on G⊆GΓN satisfies the restricted equal treatment property (RETP) if for any
(v,Γ)∈G and i, j∈N , i 6=j, hierarchically symmetric in (v,Γ) it holds that ξi(v,Γ)=ξj(v,Γ).
Players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, are hierarchically symmetric in (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN if they are both
symmetric in Γ and hierarchically symmetric in v. Players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, are symmetric
in Γ if they have the same sets of immediate successors and immediate predecessors in Γ,
i.e., (i, k) ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ (j, k) ∈ Γ and (k, i) ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ (k, j) ∈ Γ. Players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, are
hierarchically symmetric in v if for all S⊆N\{i, j} such that S, S ∪{i}, S ∪{j}, S ∪{i, j} ∈
H(Γ), it holds that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), or, equivalently, mvi (S)=m
v
j (S).
A value ξ on G ⊆GΓN meets the (restricted) hierarchical null-player property ((R)HNP)
if for all (v,Γ)∈G, ξi(v,Γ)=0 whenever i is a (restricted) hierarchical null-player in (v,Γ).
A player i ∈ N is a (restricted) hierarchical null-player in (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN if for every
S⊆N\{i} such that S, S ∪ {i}∈H(Γ) (S, S ∪ {i}∈Hc(Γ)), it holds that v(S ∪ {i})=v(S),
or, equivalently, mvi (S)=0.
Remark 3.3 Each null-player in v ∈ GN is a hierarchical null-player in any (v,Γ) ∈ G
Γ
N ,
and every hierarchical null-player in (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN is also a restricted hierarchical null-player
in (v,Γ), i.e., RHNP implies HNP.
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A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is (restricted) hierarchically marginalist ((R)HM ) if for any
(v,Γ), (w,Γ) ∈ G and i ∈ N for which mvi (S) = m
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} such that
S, S ∪ {i}∈H(Γ) (S, S ∪ {i}∈Hc(Γ)) and i ∈ UΓ(S ∪ {i}), ξi(v,Γ)=ξi(w,Γ).
If in a cycle digraph game only the grand coalition is productive, then due to symmetry
of the players on the cycle it is natural to require that they all get the same payoff.
A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is strongly symmetric on directed cycles (SSDC ) if for any (v,Γ) ∈ G
such that Γ is a directed cycle on N and v(S) = 0 for all S ( N , i.e., v = λuN for some
real λ, ξi(v,Γ)=ξj(v,Γ) for all i, j∈N , i 6=j.
A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is independent of inessential directed links (IIDL) if for any
(v,Γ) ∈ G and inessential directed link (i, j) ∈ Γ, ξ(v,Γ) = ξ(v,Γ \ {(i, j)}).
For Γ ∈ ΓN , (i, j) ∈ Γ is inessential if i dominates j in Γ and there exists a directed
path in Γ from i to j different from (i, j), i.e., i /∈ SΓ(j) and there exists i′ ∈ N such that
(i, i′) ∈ Γ, i /∈ SΓ(i′), and j ∈ SΓ(i′).
Proposition 3.2 The Shapley value for digraph games on GΓN meets E, L, RETP, HNP,
HM, SSDC, and IIL.
Proof. (E) This follows from the efficiency of all marginal contribution vectors on GN .
(L) Since (v,Γ), (w,Γ) and (av+ bw,Γ) are determined by the same Γ, ΠΓ is the same for
all. Then L follows from the linearity of all marginal contribution vectors on GN .
(RETP) Let i, j ∈ N be hierarchically symmetric in (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN . Then pi ∈ Π
Γ iff pi′ ∈ ΠΓ,
where pi′(i) = pi(j), pi′(j) = pi(i), and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}. So, it suffices
to show that m¯vi (pi) = m¯
v
j (pi
′) and m¯vj (pi) = m¯
v
i (pi
′) for any such pi and pi′. Without loss
of generality assume that pi(i) > pi(j). To show m¯vi (pi) = m¯
v
j (pi
′) note that pi′(i) = pi(j)
and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ∈ N\{i, j} imply P¯pi(i) = P¯pi′(j) and Ppi(i)\{j} = Ppi′(j)\{i}.
Let S = Ppi(i)\{j}. By Proposition 3.1, S ∪ {i}, S ∪ {j}, S ∪ {i, j} ∈ H(Γ). Since i and j
are hierarchically symmetric in v, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), i.e., v(Ppi(i)) = v(Ppi′(j)). This
together with P¯pi(i) = P¯pi′(j) implies m¯
v
i (pi) = v(P¯pi(i))−v(Ppi(i)) = v(P¯pi′(j))−v(Ppi′(j)) =
m¯vj (pi
′). To show m¯vj (pi) = m¯
v
i (pi
′) observe that Ppi(j) = Ppi′(i). Let S = Ppi(j). By
Proposition 3.1, S ∪ {i}, S ∪ {j}, S ∈ H(Γ). Since i and j are hierarchically symmetric in
v, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), i.e., v(P¯pi(j)) = v(P¯pi′(i)). So, m¯
v
j (pi) = v(P¯pi(j))−v(Ppi(j)) =
v(P¯pi′(i))−v(Ppi′ (i))=m¯
v
i (pi
′).
(HNP) Let i ∈ N be a hierarchical null player in (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN and pi ∈ Π
Γ. By Proposi-
tion 3.1, P¯pi(i), Ppi(i) ∈ H(Γ). Then, m¯
v
i (pi) = v(P¯pi(i))−v(Ppi(i)) = 0. Hence, Shi(v,Γ) = 0.
(HM) This follows from (1), Remark 3.1, and Proposition 3.1.
(SSDC) This holds true because game λuN is symmetric, Shi(λuN ) = λ/n for all i ∈ N ,
and for any cycle digraph game (v,Γ) with symmetric v, Sh(v,Γ) = Sh(v).
(IIDL) Let (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN for which (i, j) ∈ Γ is inessential. Then there exists i
′ ∈ N
such that (i, i′) ∈ Γ, i /∈ SΓ(i′), and j ∈ SΓ(i′). Let Γ′ = Γ \ {(i, j)}. We show now
that ΠΓ = ΠΓ
′
, so that Sh(v,Γ) = Sh(v,Γ′). Take pi ∈ ΠΓ and suppose pi /∈ ΠΓ
′
. Since
pi /∈ ΠΓ
′
, there exist k, k′ ∈ N , pi(k′) < pi(k), such that k′ ≻Γ′|Ppi(k) k, i.e., k ∈ S
Γ′|Ppi(k)(k′)
and k′ /∈ SΓ
′|Ppi(k)(k). From k ∈ SΓ
′|Ppi(k)(k′) and Γ′ ⊂ Γ, it follows that k ∈ SΓ|Ppi(k)(k′).
By Remark 3.1, k ∈ UΓ(P¯pi(k)) because pi ∈ Π
Γ, and therefore, k′ ∈ SΓ|Ppi(k)(k). Whence
it follows that in Γ|Ppi(k) there is a path from node k to node k
′. Both k′ /∈ SΓ
′|Ppi(k)(k)
and k′ ∈ SΓ|Ppi(k)(k) together imply that every path in Γ|Ppi(k) from node k to node k
′, if it
exists, should contain link (i, j). But due to Proposition 3.1, Ppi(k) ∈ H(Γ), and therefore,
for each path in Γ|Ppi(k) from k to k
′ containing (i, j) there exists another path in Γ|Ppi(k)
from k to k′, in which link (i, j) is replaced by the path from i to j via node i′, which
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leads to a contradiction. So, pi ∈ ΠΓ implies pi ∈ ΠΓ
′
. Take now pi′ ∈ ΠΓ
′
and suppose
pi′ /∈ ΠΓ. Since pi′ /∈ ΠΓ, there exist k, k′ ∈ N , pi′(k′) < pi′(k), such that k′ ≻Γ|P
pi′
(k)
k,
i.e., k ∈ S
Γ|P
pi′
(k)(k′) and k′ /∈ S
Γ|P
pi′
(k)(k). From k′ /∈ S
Γ|P
pi′
(k)(k) and Γ′ ⊂ Γ, it follows
that k′ /∈ S
Γ′|P
pi′
(k)(k), and therefore by Remark 3.1, k /∈ S
Γ′|P
pi′
(k)(k′) since pi′ ∈ ΠΓ
′
. Then
the conditions k ∈ S
Γ|P
pi′
(k)(k′) and k /∈ S
Γ′|P
pi′
(k)(k′) together, similarly as above, lead to a
contradiction, which proves that pi′ ∈ ΠΓ
′
implies pi′ ∈ ΠΓ.
Under the assumption that in a digraph game the digraph represents the dominance
structure on the player set, only the hierarchical coalitions are feasible. So, we define the
dominance core CD(v,Γ) of (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN as the set of efficient payoff vectors that cannot
be blocked by any hierarchical coalition, i.e., CD(v,Γ) = {x∈ IRN | x(N) = v(N), x(S)≥
v(S) for all S ∈ H(Γ)}.
A value ξ on G ⊆ GΓN is D-stable if for every (v,Γ) ∈ G, ξ(v,Γ) ∈ C
D(v,Γ).
A digraph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN is hierarchically convex if for any S, T ∈ H(Γ), v(S)+v(T ) ≤
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Remark that the hierarchical convexity for (v,Γ) is weaker than convexity for v where
the inequality is required to hold for all S, T ⊆ N .
Theorem 3.1 The Shapley value for digraph games is D-stable on the class of hierarchically
convex digraph games.
Proof. Let (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN be a hierarchically convex digraph game. Since the Shapley
value for digraph games is efficient, it suffices to show that
∑
i∈S m¯
v
i (pi) ≥ v(S) for every
S ∈ H(Γ) and pi ∈ ΠΓ. Take any S ∈ H(Γ) and pi ∈ ΠΓ, and let S1, . . . , Sk partition S
such that Sh = {i ∈ S | pi(bh) ≤ pi(i) ≤ pi(ah)}, h = 1, . . . , k, where the numbers ah and
bh, h = 1, . . . , k, satisfy pi(ah−1) + 1 < pi(bh) ≤ pi(ah), with pi(a0) = −1. Define P¯pi(a0) = ∅.
For any h ∈ {1, . . . , k} consider the sets S ∪ P¯pi(ah−1) and Ppi(bh). By Proposition 3.1 and
since S is hierarchical, both sets are hierarchical coalitions. Moreover, their intersection is
equal to P¯pi(ah−1) and their union is equal to S ∪ P¯pi(ah). Hierarchical convexity implies
v(S ∪ P¯pi(ah)) + v(P¯pi(ah−1)) ≥ v(S ∪ P¯pi(ah−1)) + v(Ppi(bh)).
By repeated application of this inequality for h = 1, . . . k, we obtain
v(S ∪ P¯pi(ak)) +
k∑
h=1
v(P¯pi(ah−1)) ≥ v(S ∪ P¯pi(a0)) +
k∑
h=1
v(Ppi(bh)).
P¯pi(a0) = ∅ and S ∪ P¯pi(ak) = P¯pi(ak) imply
k∑
h=1
v(P¯pi(ah)) ≥ v(S) +
k∑
h=1
v(Ppi(bh)).
Since
∑
i∈Sh
m¯vi (pi) = v(P¯pi(ah)− v(Ppi(bh)), h = 1, . . . , k, and
∑
i∈S
m¯vi (pi) =
k∑
h=1
∑
i∈Sh
m¯vi (pi), we
obtain
∑
i∈S
m¯vi (pi) ≥ v(S).
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4 Axiomatization for cycle digraph games
On the subclass of cycle-free digraph games the Shapley value for digraph games coincides
with the Shapley value for games with precedence constraints of Faigle and Kern [2]. Thus,
the axiomatization of the latter value obtained in [2] serves also for the Shapley value for
cycle-free digraph games. Now we obtain an axiomatization of the Shapley value on another
subclass of GΓ
c
N , the subclass of cycle digraph games. Remark 3.2 implies that a directed
cycle on a player set is a connected digraph, every node of which is an undominated player.
Theorem 4.1 The Shapley value for digraph games is the unique value on GΓ
c
N that meets
E, L, RHM, and SSDC.
Proof. I [Existence]. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.2 concerning E, L,
HM, and SSDC. For RHM in comparison to HM we only need to add that due to Remark 3.2
all hierarchical coalitions involved are connected.
II [Uniqueness]. First prove that on GΓ
c
N E, RHM, and SSDC imply RHNP. Take any
(v,Γ) ∈ GΓ
c
N with restricted hierarchical null-player i and let v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . Hence,
mvi (S) = 0 = m
v0
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} with S, S ∪{i} ∈ H
c(Γ) and i ∈ UΓ(S ∪{i}). RHM
implies ξi(v,Γ) = ξi(v0,Γ). E and SSDC imply ξj(v0,Γ)=0, j ∈ N . Whence, ξi(v,Γ) = 0.
Since unanimity games form a basis in GN , due to L it suffices to show that ξ(uT ,Γ) is
uniquely determined for all (uT ,Γ) ∈ G
Γ
c
N , T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,.
If T = N , then E and SSDC imply ξi(uN ,Γ) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N .
If T ∈ CΓ(N), T 6= N , then due to Remark 3.2 UΓ(T ) = {r} for some r ∈ T . For all i ∈
T\{r} and S ⊆ N\{i} such that S, S∪{i} ∈ Hc(Γ) and i ∈ UΓ(S∪{i}), muTi (S)=m
uN
i (S).
RHM implies ξi(uT ,Γ)= ξi(uN ,Γ)=
1
n
, i∈T\{r}. Since every i ∈ N\T is a null-player in
uT , then by Remark 3.3 each i ∈ N\T is a restricted hierarchical null-player in (uT ,Γ) and
by RHNP ξi(uT ,Γ)=0. E implies ξr(uT ,Γ)=1−
|T |−1
n
.
Finally, take any T /∈ CΓ(N). Let T/Γ = {T1, . . . , Tk}, then U
Γ(Th) = {rh} for some
rh ∈ Th, h = 1, . . . , k. Each i ∈ N\T is a restricted hierarchical null-player in (uT ,Γ) and
for all i ∈ T\{r1, . . . , rk} and S ⊆ N\{i} such that S, S ∪ {i} ∈ H
c(Γ) and i ∈ UΓ(S ∪ {i}),
muTi (S) = m
uN
i (S). RHNP implies ξi(uT ,Γ) = 0, i ∈ N\T , and RHM implies ξi(uT ,Γ) =
1
n
,
i ∈ T\{r1, . . . , rk}. For given h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let T
h ∈ CΓ(N) be the unique smallest
connected set containing T such that UΓ(T h) = {rh}. Then each i ∈ N \ T
h is a restricted
hierarchical null player in (uTh ,Γ) and for all i ∈ T
h\{rh} and S ⊆ N\{i} such that
S, S ∪{i} ∈ Hc(Γ) and i ∈ UΓ(S ∪{i}), m
u
Th
i (S) = m
uN
i (S). RHNP implies ξi(uTh ,Γ) = 0,
i ∈ N\T h, and RHM implies ξi(uTh ,Γ) =
1
n
, i ∈ T h\{rh}. E implies ξrh(uTh ,Γ) = 1−
|Th|−1
n
.
Since for all S ⊆ N\{rh} satisfying S, S ∪ {rh} ∈ H
c(Γ) and rh ∈ U
Γ(S ∪ {rh}) it holds
that m
u
Th
rh (S) = m
uT
rh
(S), RHM implies ξrh(uT ,Γ) = ξrh(uTh ,Γ) = 1−
|Th|−1
n
.
Remark 4.1 The classical Shapley value is axiomatized in Young [10] by efficiency, equal
treatment property, and marginality, without a priori requirement of additivity. However,
for the axiomatization of the Shapley value for digraph games on the subclass of cycle
digraph games we need both linearity and restricted marginality. The induction argument
of Young does not work in this case because the decomposition of a TU game is considered
via the unanimity basis determined by all possible coalitions, but opposite to marginality
in Young [10], restricted marginality considers only the hierarchical coalitions, which form
here a proper subset of the set of all coalitions.
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grant RF-CN 13.01.91160. The research was done during her stay at the University of
Twente, whose hospitality is appreciated.
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